Movingto
Head of Product, 2021–present
- €6.76m
- of client capital placed into 10 investment funds
- 96%
- instalment collection across the client book
Context
Movingto helps people relocate through residency-by-investment programmes, mostly Portugal's Golden Visa and its equivalents. A client typically commits somewhere between €280k and €500k of capital, plus six months of their life. The category is regulated, the stakes are high, and almost every source of advice is paid by one of the possible answers.
I have been Head of Product since 2021, across movingto.com, funds.movingto.com and the internal operations stack.
Problem
The decision stacks three questions on top of each other. Should I move at all. Which programme. Which fund. Prospects arrived having read fifteen conflicting articles, and what they wanted was a person.
Commercially, the funnel could produce enquiries in volume but most were not qualified. Sales time went to people who were never going to commit €280k while genuinely ready clients waited.
My role
Product across the journey: the research content, the comparison tooling, the qualification model, the booking funnel, and the internal ledger the operations team runs on. I own what gets built and the analytics that judge it afterwards.
Insight
Two findings redirected the roadmap.
Traffic quality beat traffic volume.
Attribution showed comparison and listicle content produced the highest-value leads, while the services pages, the ones that looked most commercial, produced almost none. We had been optimising the pages that described what we sold instead of the pages that helped people decide.
Google was not the audience we assumed.
Pulling real analytics instead of SEO-tool estimates put Google at about 5.5% of sessions on the main site, with Bing three times larger. On a sister property, AI assistants were sending six times the traffic Google was. We had built a content strategy for a search engine that was not sending the visitors.
Product decisions
We built comparison tooling instead of more content.
The Fund Finder walks someone through the constraints that genuinely differ between funds: capital, term, liquidity, regulatory status. It returns a shortlist. It also qualifies people as a side effect of being useful, because anyone who finishes it has told us their budget and timeline without being interrogated.
We published the constraints, including the disqualifying ones.
Fund pages carry fees, terms and regulatory status whether or not those flatter the fund. This costs us enquiries and improves the ones we get. When every other source in a category is selling, being the one that occasionally tells you not to proceed is worth more than another landing page.
We restructured around answer engines rather than search alone.
Content was rebuilt to be extractable and citable, with direct answers and explicit sourcing, because that is what the measurement said was growing.
We rejected a domain migration.
The funds property ranked at positions 4 to 12 and carried around 30% of the domain's organic clicks, and it had not inherited the main site's ranking decline. Once we looked at the actual data, the SEO argument for moving it fell apart.
Execution
Small team, heavy instrumentation. I work directly in the CMS and the database rather than routing every change through engineering, so a content or pricing decision can ship the same day.
On the operations side, I specified an internal commercials ledger and had it built, then reconciled it against the banking rails, because the revenue picture had been spread across four payment processors and two entities.
Outcome
| Result | |
|---|---|
| Client capital placed into 10 investment funds | €6.76m |
| Instalment collection across the client book | 96% |
| Average package value | ≈ €4,867 |
| Share of domain organic clicks carried by the funds property | ≈ 30% |
The 96% collection rate is a product outcome as much as a finance one, because it reflects the payment and document workflow rather than chasing.
What I learned
Instrument before you argue. The two decisions that mattered most here, killing the services-page optimisation and refusing the domain migration, were both cases where the team held a confident intuition and one honest data pull settled it in an afternoon.
The other thing I learned is that in a high-trust category, being straight with people pays. Publishing the disqualifying facts lost us enquiries and raised close rates.